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New Standards for Domination and Support
Under Section 8(a)(2)
Section 8(a)(2) of the National Labor Relations Act,' which makes
it unlawful 2 for an employer to interfere with, dominate, or sup-
port3 any labor organization 4 has been vigorously enforced to main-
1. The National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act), 1935, ch. 372, §§ 1-16, 45 Stat. 4,49
[hereinafter cited as NLRA], as amended by The Labor-Management Relations Act (Taft.
Hartley Act), 1947, ch. 120, § 101 et seq., 61 Stat. 136, further amended by The Labor
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (Landrum-Griffin Act), lub. L. No.
86-257, § 1 et seq., 73 Stat. 519. These statutes are codified at 29 U.S.C. § 141 et seq. (1970).
Section 8(a)(2) provides:
(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-
(2) to dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of any labor
organization or contribute financial or other support to it: Provided, That subject
to rules and regulations made and published by the Board pursuant to section 156
of this title [NLRA § 6], an employer shall not be prohibited from permitting
employees to confer with him during working hours without loss of pay .-...
NLRA § 8(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1970).
2. A cease and desist order is used in case of a relatively minor violation, and requires
an end to employer interference with the labor organization. See, e.g., Regency Electron.
ics, Inc., 169 N.L.R.B. 223 (1968); Higgins Industries, Inc., 150 N.L.R.B. 106 (196). In
more serious cases of support under § 8(a)(2), the order may require temporary suspension
of recognition as the collective bargaining agent, if such recognition has been given. Sete,
e.g., Jack Smith Beverages, Inc., 94 N.L.R.B. 1401 (1951), modified, 202 F.2d 100 (6th
Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 995 (1953). In cases of complete domination, the cm-
ployer is required to disestablish the organization, and is forever barred from recognizing
it as the collective bargaining representative. See, e.g., Carpenter Steel Co., 76 N.L.RB. 670
(1948). The Board has broad discretion concerning the nature of its remedies. NLRA §
10(a), (c), 29 U.S.C. § 160(a), (c) (1970).
3. Domination and support cases are filed tinder both the specific provisions of §
8(a)(2) and also under § 8(a)(1)'s more general prohibitions against interference. See,
e.g., Dennison Mfg. Co., 168 N.L.R.B. 1012 (1967). The latter section provides:
(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-
(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of their rights
guaranteed in section 157 of this title [NLRA § 7) ....
NLRA § 8(a)(l), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1970).
Section 8(a)(l)'s prohibition against interference is interpreted as a blanket restriction
on an) of the practices particularized in §§ 8(a)(2) through 8(a)(5). Oberer, The Scienter
Factor in Sections 8(aX1) and (3) of the Labor Act: Of Balancing, Hostile Motive, Dogs and
Tails, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 491, 493 (1967). Henceforth, references to § 8(a)(2) should be read
as including § 8(a)(1).
4. The NLRA defines a labor organization as follows:
The term "labor organization" means any organization of any kind, or any agency
or employee representation committee or plan, in which employees participate and
which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers con.
cerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or con.
ditions of work.
NLRA § 2(5), 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (1970).
This definition was intentionally made broad enough to include not only normal
unions, but also employees' committees and employees' representation plans. S. Ri. No.
573, 74th Cong., Ist Sess. 7 (1935). See pp. 513-14 infra. However, purely social organl.
zations are exempt. Hudson Dispatch, 68 N.L.R.B. 115, 1241 (1946). Employer contentions
510
Domination and Support Under Section 8(a)(2)
tain a strict dichotomy between labor and management. Yet such a
stringent typology is based on assumptions about the labor market and
the ideology of the labor movement which may no longer be warranted
in substantial sectors of today's economy. This Note will argue that
there should be a limited redefinition of the law of domination and
support: Where employees are genuinely uninterested in developing
traditional union structures, and where the employer acts in good faith,
the law should provide for a class of permissibly-assisted labor organi-
zations which would fill the need for more innovative labor-manage-
ment structures than have hitherto been allowed under § 8(a)(2). This
approach would expand the freedom of choice ostensibly guaranteed by
the Act, and thus further its primary goals of industrial justice and
tranquillity.
6
I. Traditional Standards Under § 8(a)(2)
A. The Per Se Rule
Although never made explicit, the traditional standard in § 8(a)(2)
cases is essentially a per se rule.7 Any employer support of a labor
organization is illegal beyond a certain critical level,8 regardless of the
character of the challenged organization," the intent of the employer,10
that a challenged organization does not fall within the statutory definition, and for that
reason does not constitute a violation, have nearly always failed. See Note, Section 8(aX2):
Employer Assistance to Plant Unions and Commttees, 9 STAN. L. REv. 351, 353.54 (1957).
and cases cited therein. Subsequent amendments to the Act have not altered this defi-
nitional breadth. Therefore, for the purposes of § 8(a)(2), a labor organization need not
meet the internal requirements of the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act
of 1959 (Landrum-Griffin Act), 29 U.S.C. § 401 et seq. (1970), Inyo Lumber Co. of Calif.,
129 N.L.R.B. 79 (1960), or even have a formal structure at all, Mark L. Jerri, 128 N.L.R.B.
778 (1960). Nonetheless, attempting to defend § 8(a)(2) complaints on the ground that the
challenged organization does not constitute a labor organization has been one of the most
enduring (and bootless) employer approaches to this section. Cf. notes 114-15 infra.
5. Since 1936, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) has disposed of over 17,000
cases involving § 8(a)(2). 1-35 NLRB, ANN. REP. (1936-70) (figure derived by cumulating
the reported number of § 8(a)(2) cases for each year).
6. Cf. NLRA § 1, 29 U.S.C. 151 (1970) (Findings and Declaration of Polic)).
7. The only explicit standard ever enunciated by the Board is that it decides § 8(a)(2)
cases on the basis of the "totality" of the circumstances. See note 25 infra.
8. "The general rule has developed that an employer is guilty of an unfair labor prac-
tice whenever his support or domination of a union has reached the point where it is rea-
sonable to infer that the union is not truly the employees' representative in disputes .... "
COMMERCE CLEARING HousE, GumEBooK "To LABOR RnxrIONS 149 (1960) (emphasis added).
See also M. FoRKOSCH, A TREATIsE ON LAuOR LAW 668-72 (1965) and cases cited therein.
9. NLRB v. Jas. H. Matthews & Co., 156 F.2d 706 (3d Cir. 1946) C'junior board" in
"multiple management" plan); Boyle's Famous Corned Beef Co., 168 N.L.R.B. 299, 303
(1967) (independent union); Weather Seal Inc., 161 N.L.R.B. 1226, 1236-37 (1966) (inter-
national union); Poe Machine & Engineering Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 1372, 1387 (19-4) (interim
organization).
10. In Northeastern Engineering, Inc., 112 N.L.R.B. 743, 750 (1955), the Board ordered
disestablishment despite a specific finding that there was "no proof that the Adisory
Committee was set up with any intention of evading the law or making it a substitute
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or the will of the employees." Under this per se rule, virtually the only
question ever litigated is whether the challenged actions are sufficient
to constitute the illegal quantum of support.
In practice, this rigid rule has meant that an employer may be
found in violation if he assists in or defrays the costs of elections for a
labor organization; 12 helps in or is present at the drawing of its char-
ter;13 arranges for its attorney;14 supplies a place'8 or refreshments for
its meeting;' 6 furnishes any direct financial support, 17 no matter how
meager;' 8 provides indirect financial aid, as, for example, from vend-
ing machines 9 or the plant store; 20 allows the organization to use his
safe,2 ' mimeograph machine,2 2 or telephone;23 or provides secretarial
services.24 In short, an employer must leave a union or other labor or-
ganization scrupulously alone, or the Board, usually upon the com-
plaint of an outside union or a dissident employee, will force him to
do so.
25
for collective bargaining." Accord, NLRB v. Clappers Mfg., Inc., 458 F.2d 414 (3d Cir.
1972) (violation despite employer's possible "exemplary" intentions). See also p. 513 inIra.
11. The fact that employees express a desire to be represented by a labor organization
has been said not to be determinative of, or even relevant to, the question of whether
that organization has in fact been dominated and assisted by the employer. NLRB v.
Newport News Shipbldg. & Dry Dock Co., 308 U.S. 241 (1939); NLRB v. Brown Paper
Mill Co., 108 F.2d 867 (5th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 651 (1940).
12. See Newman-Green, Inc., 161 N.L.R.B. 1062, 1065 (1966); I-1 & H Plastics Co.,
158 N.L.R.B. 1395 (1966).
13. See Thompson Rano Wooldridge, Inc., 132 N.LR.B. 993, 1006 (1961).
14. See Guard Services, Inc., 134 N.L.R.B. 1753, 1755 (1966).
15. See Dennison Mfg. Co., 168 N.L.R.B. 1012, 1017 (1967); Merrill Transport Co.,
141 N.L.R.B. 1089, 1099 (1963).
16. See Kunst d/b/a Connor Foundry Co., 100 N.L.R.B. 146, 150 (1952), enI'd, 202
F.2d 846 (6th Cir. 1953); Standard Transformer Co., 97 N.L.R.B. 669, 671 (1951),
17. See Dennison Mfg. Co., 168 N.L.R.B. 1012, 1017 (1967); Kunst d/b/a Connor
Foundry Co., 100 N.L.R.B. 146, 151 (1952), enj'd, 202 F.2d 846 (6th Cir. 1953).
18. See Wyman-Gordon Co. v. NLRB, 153 F.2d 481, 482 (1946); Wheeling Steel Corp.,
1 N.L.R.B. 699; 708-09 (1936) (50 cents donation per employee each year held a § 8(a)(2)
violation).
19. See Utrad Corp., 185 N.L.R.B. No. 49, 75 L.R.R.M. 1069, 1071 (1970); Master
Transmission Rebuilding Corp., 155 N.L.R.B. 364, 366, enj'd, 373 F.2d 402 (9th Cir. 1964).
20. See Clark Equipment Co., 12 N.L.R.B. 1469, 1479 (1939).
21. See Crowley Milk Co., Inc., 88 N.L.R.B. 1049, 1061 (1950), modified, 208 F.2d 444
(3d Cir. 1953).
22. See Nutone, Inc., 112 N.L.R.B. 1153, 1170 (1955). Such use may be excused, how.
ever, if it is "trivial and isolated." Crompton-Shenandoah Co., Inc., 135 N.L.R.B. 694, 697
(1962).
23. See Shell Oil Co. of Calif., 2 N.L.R.B. 835, 847 (1937).
24. See Newman-Green, Inc., 161 N.L.R.B. 1062, 1066 (1967).
25. It is an over-simplification to assert that the examples enumerated in the text
outline the parameters of § 8(a)(2). In fact, the parameters are unknown, because the
Board declines to make clear the precise type or amount of assistance needed to trigger
a violation. Rather, the Board maintains that it does not view individual actions, but in-
stead considers the "totality" of a situation. 2 NLRB ANN. REP. 95 (1937). It is there.
fore extremely difficult to find the precise basis for the Board's holding in any case, or
to extract from the Board's description of the "totality" those separate actions which,
of themselves, will or will not support an 8(a)(2) violation. For this reason, the Board's
totality approach has been criticized as "indiscriminate lumping." Note, Section 8(aX2),
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Once sufficient employer assistance is shown, no defense is available.
Thus, in NLRB v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dydock Co., 20 the
Supreme Court affirmed the disestablishment of an employer-assisted
labor organization under 8(a)(2), in explicit disregard of "uncontra-
dicted" findings that the company had "good motives" in assisting the
organization, that the organization operated "to the apparent satisfac-
tion of employees," that the company practiced no discrimination or
coercion of any kind, that the employees were free to join other labor
organizations, and that the organization had solved labor disputes and
promoted industrial tranquillity.
27
While 8(a)(2) actions frequently arise because of the indiscretions of
otherwise independent local unions,2 8 the clearest case of the per se
rule in action is the Board's unforgiving hostility to in-plant, employer-
sponsored, non-union "employees' committees."209 Whether termed
"shop committees," "grievance councils," or "employees' representation
plans," virtually all such organizations are illegal under the traditional
doctrine.30 Thus, violations have been found not only where the em-
supra note 4, at 34. The Board's decisions can in fact be quite unpredictable. Compare
Sea Life, Inc., 175 N.L.R.B. 982, 985, 996 (1969) (Examiner dismissed 8(a)(2) charge as
without "scintilla" of evidence; Board reversed, calling it a "classic" case) with Hession
Corp., Inc., 175 N.L.R.B. 96, 103 (1969) (Examiner found 8(a)(2) violation on cumulation
of evidence; Board dismissed in entirety, unconvinced by "totality"). Thus, no single in-
stance of assistance such as enumerated is technically a violation; rather, it is evidence
of a violation. The Board's long record with 8(a)(2) cases, however, indicates a low level
of tolerance for such assistance.
26. 308 U.S. 241, 251 (1939).
27. For recent examples of this per se rule at work, see notes 106 & 107 infra.
28. See, e.g., Wyco Metal Products, 183 N.L.R.B. No. 93, 74 L.R.R.M. 1411 (1970)
(allowing incumbent union to meet on company property an 8(a)(2) violation); Crown
Discount Dept. Stores, 172 N.L.R.B. No. 89, 69 L..R.LM. 1565 (1968) (allowing union
organizer to use a room a violation).
29. Generally, an employees' committee is an independent labor organization, unaffili-
ated with a national union and considerably less formal than even an independent local.
Typically, it has a vague structure and purpose, frequently has no dues, by-laws, or con-
stitution, and deals with management on such varied topics as terms and conditions of
employment, grievances, safety, recreation, or any other matter. Its distinguishing feature
is that the degree of management participation is considerably greater than in more
formal unions.
30. See generally Note, Section 8(aX2), supra note 4. See also Feldman & Steinberg.
Employee-Management Committees and the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947,
35 Tr. L. Rav. 365, 366 (1961):
A long line of court [and Board] decisions, with no discernible common thread,
has stricken down, with apparent mechanical regularity, a succession of plans whereby
employers have sought to establish employee-management committees to adjust the
multitude of day-to-day shop grievances.
The "common thread," it would seem, is simply the Board's singleminded application of
the per se rule.
At first, the NLRB's hostility to this type of organization mas institutionalized. It dif-
ferentiated between unaffiliated independent locals and locals affiliated with national
unions by completely disestablishing the former and just temporarily withholding recog-
nition from the latter, in cases of employer assistance. In response to protests that inde-
pendents could be just as effective as affiliated unions, and ought to be treated equally,
Congress included in the Taft-Hartey Act a specific directive that independents were to
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ployer actually formed the committee,31 but also where he caused it to
be formed32 or where the organization never developed the character-
istics of an independent entity, such as a constitution, by-laws, dues,
meetings, or collective agreements. 3 3 It has been held a violation of
8(a)(2) to suggest the formation of an employees' committee,3 4 to be its
sustaining force, 35 or to deal with one on an interim basis.30 In general,
the enduring and singleminded goal of the Board and the courts has
been to force the employer to "refrain from any action which will place
him on both sides of the bargaining table." 37
B. The Adversary Model of Labor Relations
During the 1930's there was undoubtedly a need for such an uncom-
promising rule. In 1935, the year in which the NLRA was enacted,
employer-dominated labor organizations such as the "Employee Repre-
sentation Plans" fostered by the defunct National Industrial Recovery
Act accounted for over 2,500,000 workers.38 These organizations were,
for the most part, patent creatures of management, mere charades of
representation which hampered outside organizing, and organized
labor fought bitterly to have such "company unions" outlawed for-
ever.39 The argument that "collective bargaining becomes a mockery
when the spokesman of the employees is the marionette of the em-
ployer"40 was persuasive to the Congress, and the Board was conse-
quently given broad power under 8(a)(2) to combat employer inter-
ference.41 So armed, the Board and the courts began a vigorous en-
forcement effort, 42 and the strict per se approach developed quickly.
be treated equally. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1970). The Board has followed this directive.
See Carpenter Steel Co., 76 N.L.R.B. 670 (1948); Jack Smith Beverages, Inc., 94 N.L.R.B.
1401 (1951), modified, 202 F.2d 100 (6th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 995 (1955). This
change is discussed in further detail in Note, Section 8(aX2), supra note 4, at 356.
31. Dale Electronics, Inc., 137 N.L.R.B. 1212, 1216-17 (1962).
32. NLRB v. Philamon Laboratories, Inc., 298 F.2d 176, 181 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. de.
nied, 370 U.S. 919 (1962); Aluminum Extrusions, Inc., 148 N.L.R.B. 1662 (1964).
33. 25 NLRB, ANN. REP. 60 (1960). See also Detroit Plastics Products Co., 126 N.L.R.B.
1182, 1184 (1960).
34. Ben Corson Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 323, 338 (1955).
35. Birmingham Post Co., 49 N.L.R.B. 206, 207 (1943), end, 140 F.2d 638 (5th Cir.
1944).
36. Poe Machine & Engineering Co., Inc., 107 N.L.R.B. 1372 (1954).
37. NLRB v. Mt. Clemens Metal Products Co., 287 F.2d 790, 791 (6th Cir. 1961).
38. C. SuMMERs & H. WELLINGTON, LABOR LAW 419, 420 (1968).
39. L. SAULNY, INDEPENDENT UNIONS 25 (1944). See generally R. DUNN, COMIPANY UNIONS
(1927).
40. 79 CONG. RFc. 7570 (1935).
41. See S. REP. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 9-11 (1935).
42. For early histories of the enforcement of the provision, see Crager, Company Unions
Under the National Labor Relations Act, 40 MICH. L. REV. 831 (1942); Note, Employer.
Dominated Unions-Illusory Self-Organization, 40 COLUM. L. REV. '278 (1940). See also,
e.g., 3 NLRB, ANN. REP. 108-26 (1938).
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Only in light of labor's struggle against the early company unions is
the per se rule intelligible. Standing alone, it is not entirely logical;
outright employer assistance by itself need be neither detrimental nor
improper. In fact, when a labor organization is gratuitously given an
office or a typist, that would appear to be a benefit. The per se pro-
hibition on such assistance is understandable only when coupled with
the presumption that employer assistance to labor organizations is
necessarily subversive to the interests of the employees.
Since many would agree-the unions most vigorously-that the
NLRA represented the triumph of one ideology over another,43 it is
not surprising that there is an entire series of such presumptions im-
plicit in the Act. Some of these presumptions, which together may be
called the "adversary model" of labor relations, include: There exists
an inherent conflict of interest between employers and employees; this
conflict leads to hostility; employers wish to subvert the interests of
their employees; no informed employee would align himself with his
employer; any organization of employees in which management plays
a part is thus necessarily a fraud and contrary to the employees' best
interests.
II. The Need for New Standards
A. The Decline of the Company Union
Today, however, the more blatant forms of company unionism have
largely disappeared. 44 While employer attempts to manipuate through
assistance continue to pose some problems,4 5 the concept of inde-
pendently organized labor has achieved general acceptance. Cases in-
volving § 8(a)(2) are increasingly less common,46 and ideological dis-
43. See, e.g., N. CHAMBERLAIN, THE LABOR SECTOR 125, 126 (1965); W. Srr..%cn, NA-
TIONAL LABOR RELATONS ACT 1-5 (1935); T. SLuSsER, THE LABOR ACT-Is rr TonERABL.
(1939).
44. Most contemporary 8(a)(2) complaints have nothing to do with classic "company
unionism." Rather, they are essentially disputes between regular unions over which shall
be the certified collective bargaining agent. Thus, current cases typically involve situa-
tions in which an employer recognizes a minority union, C. H. Heist Corp., 186 N.L.R.B.
No. 57, 76 L.R.R.M. 1062, 1063-64 (1970), or helps one union gain favor over another with
his employees, Sturgeon Electric Co., Inc., 166 N.L.R.B. 210 (1967), or continues to check
off dues after a union security agreement has expired, Penn Cork & Closures, Inc., 156
N.L.R.B. 411 (1965).
45. C. SuMMEmS & H. WELLiNGTON, supra note 38, at 421; M. FoRuosca, supra note 8,
at 668.
46. In 1938, 8(a)(2) charges constituted 19.5% of all unfair labor practice complaints.
Between 1941 and 1949, they constituted 9.8%, and between 1961 and 1969, 6.3%. By 1970,
the figure had dropped to 4.5%. 1-35 NLRB, ANN. REi'. (1936-70) (percentages derived
from yearly statistics).
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cussion of the subject has virtually ceased.47 As early as 1953, a former
Board chairman declared the company union problem to be "almost
dead."'48 The issue, in short, has given way to more pressing contro-
versies.
Simultaneously, other developments have rendered the existence of
company unions less threatening. Section 8(a)(2) was not only a pro-
tective device for individual workers, but also a means for promoting
the growth of organized labor.40 Yet as organized labor has achieved
maturity, public policy efforts have turned from nurturing unions to
limiting and regulating them.r0 The early threat, actual or perceived,
of management's co-optation of the labor movement is no longer a
problem.
On this ground alone, it can be argued that it is now inappropriate
to follow the stringent per se rule. If the justification for outlawing
even non-detrimental assistance lay in the overall threat of massive
company co-optation, then, to the extent that company unionism no
longer poses such a threat, the law should fashion more subtle stand-
ards to differentiate truly detrimental cases of employer assistance from
non-detrimental ones. The per se rule, a meat cleaver once appropriate
for hacking through the mass of company unions, needs to be replaced
with a scalpel for excising occasional malignancies. 5 '
B. The Inapplicability of the Adversary Model
The inadequacy of the per se rule runs even deeper, however, to its
very basis in the adversary model. Today, substantial numbers of work-
47. The most recent scholarly commentary on the ideological basis for § 8(a)(2) ap.
pears to be Note, Section 8(aX2), supra note 4, which appeared in 1959.
48. Remarks of ex-Board Chairman Herzog, Hearings on H. Res. 115 Before th House
Comm. on Education and Labor, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. I at 266 (1935).
49. Contemporary proponents of the Wagner Act were extremely sensitive to charges
of fostering trade union monopoly rather than worker autonomy. See remarks of Senator
Wagner in Hearings on H.R. 6288 Before the House Comm. on Labor, 74th Cong., 1st
Sess., at 15 (1935), vigorously denying such charges. Nonetheless, shoring up organized
labor was certainly a predominant goal of the campaign against company unions; to
labor sympathizers, employee representation plans portended the defeat of the trade
union, movement." R. DUNN, COMPANY UNIONS 20 (1927), quoting G. WATKIN, INTRODUC-
TION TO THE STUDY OF LABOR PROBLEMS. This vein is occasionally evident in the legislative
history. Cf. S. REP. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1953).
50. The Labor-Management Relations Act, 1947 (Taft-Hartley Act), 29 U.S.C. § 141 et
seq., sets forth a series of unfair labor practices which can be committed by labor organi.
zatiois themselves. The Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (Lan-
drum-Griffin Act), 29 U.S.C. § 401 et seq., regulates internal union democracy.
51. Judge Wisdom, in his dissent in Walton Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 289 F.2d 177, 182 (5th
Cir. 1961), made this point with regard to the Board's dislike of employees' committees:
The Board, with a bull-dog grip, has seized on a policy of unyielding hostility to all
employee committees. This method of attacking a problem shows a certain grin de-
termination that in some situations is a virtue. It is not a virtue, as this case demon-
strates to me, when the Board assumes the policy has a universal applicability the
policy does not possess.
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ers no longer have an interest in class struggle politics. .2 There is a
decline in union membership;5 3 strikes are more difficult to organize
and maintain; 54 organized labor has made little headway with white
collar employees;55 the moral fervor that once drove the movement
seems to have died.5 6
It has been suggested that changes in technology and in the structure
of the labor market have resulted in a corresponding change in the
orientation and goals of many workers." Status,5 8 responsibility to
52. Substantial minorities were never included in the first place. Perennially beyond
the adversary model has been the small group of traditional unionists who have become
disaffected with organized labor for various personal reasons. See generally P. SULTAN,
THE DISENCHANTED UNIONIST (1963). A larger excluded group are ethnic minorities, to
whom organized labor has generally shown disinterest or hostility. See generally P. JAcOBS,
THE STATE OF THE UNIONS 154-91 (1963).
53. M. EsiEY, THE UNIONS 3 (1967).
54. J. BEiRNE, CHALLENGE TO LABOR 203 (1969). Ross, Labor Organizations and the
Labor Movement in Advanced Industrial Society, 50 VA. L. REv. 1359, 1361 (1964), notes
that
[tjhe proportion of union members involved in stoppages, and the loss of working
time in relation to the number of union members or the size of the labor force have
diminished.
55. P. JACOBS, supra note 52, at 261.
In 1968, only 3.2 million of an estimated 23.3 million unionizable white-collar workers
were actually union members, and less than one tenth of one per cent vote themselves
into unions each year. E. CURTIN (NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL CONFERENCE BOAI)), W ITE-COLLAR
UNIONIZATION 1, 2, 5 (1970). The 3.2 million total represents 16 per cent of all union
members. Some unions are attempting to broaden their base among white-collar workers
or are, in fact, almost totally composed of white-collar workers. Id. at 9, 12. For the
most part, however, the AFL-CIO has summarily dismissed the associations that claim the
allegiance of white-collar, technical and professional workers as company unions. P.
JACOBS, supra note 52, at 281.
56. Ross, supra note 54, at 1366; P. SULTAN, supra note 52, at 13.
57. See generally Ross, supra note 54. The change in orientation has been almost
universally perceived, although not precisely identified. See, e.g., J. BDama, supra note 54,
at 201; P. SULTAN, supra note 52, at 7; P. JAcoBs, supra note 52, at 273; J. SErMMAN, J.
LONDON, B. KARSH & D. TAGLiAcozzo, THE WORKER Vmws His UNION 256, 266 (1968);
Strauss, Professionalism & Occupational Associations, 2 L'usTRIAL RELATIoNS 14-18 (1963).
The causes of the change are disputed. Increased automation and technological change
is undoubtedly a factor. Thus, a white-collar worker at a keypunch may be doing pre.
cisely the type of line production work which would historically have made him a union
candidate, but he may nonetheless spurn a union as a lower class device, and see him-
self as far removed from traditional class struggle worries over speed-ups and lock-outs.
However, worker rejection of the adversary model is not exclusively a white-collar
phenomenon, a fact demonstrated by the long history of functioning company unions
among blue-collar workers. The breakdown of this model for increasing numbers of
blue-collar workers may have been hastened by economic and governmental changes
that have eroded the perception of unions as job-protectors, P. SULTAN, supra note 52,
at 15, in combination with increasing government willingness to act as employment in-
surer and last-resort employer. The most significant factor, however, may well be simply
the generally greater level of affluence.
While the existence of non-traditional goals is widely recognized, the authors differ
over the appropriate labor-management organization which they imply. See, e.g., Strauss,
supra, at 14-15, who implies that such workers should be forced into an adversary mold
for their own good.
58. It is often argued that the white-collar worker's demonstrated reluctance to
join unions is due to a fear of losing status-to a feeling that unions are for blue-
collar workers only. Since this attitude has persisted long after the average salaries
of blue-collar workers have risen above those of non-supervisory white-collar workers
we must conclude that white-collar workers are willing to make economic sacrifices
to maintain their status.
M. Esrmy, supra note 53, at 82, 83 (emphasis added).
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society, achievement, and work satisfaction are goals that white collar
and even many blue collar employees often share with their employers,
and which may lead them to reject traditional unions.59 Instead of
viewing themselves as adversaries of management,0 0 contemporary
workers often identify with the company.61 In contrast to the tradi-
tional adversary model, this orientation might appropriately be charac-
terized in terms of a "coalition model."0 2 Examples of coalition rather
than adversary orientation may be found in the white collar technicians
of a university, whose primary allegiance is to the intellectual com-
munity; 3 in the workers of a small and highly specialized company,
who appreciate the owner's paternalism; among the secretaries of a
large law firm, whose one-on-one employment structure may be most
important to them; 4 or among nurses, who have the same educational
background and professional ethic as their supervisors.0"
While it is clear to commentators that, for workers who view them-
selves as somewhere between traditional labor and traditional man-
agement, "'in-between' policies will have to be worked out,"00 na-
59. In contrast, the paradigmatic production worker and union recruit is characterized
by purely acquisitive occupational desires, no commitment to calling, no desire for
autonomy, no sense of obligation to turn out high quality work, and, in keeping with the
adversary model, little or no sense of identification with the company. Strauss, supra
note 57, at 11, 12.
60. Research indicates that most American workers put themselves into the middle
class, and perceive no particular struggle between themselves and anyone else based on
class. Ross, supra note 54, at 1379.
61. Strauss, supra note 57, at 14.
62. It is not suggested that the attitudes of the coalition model are ubiquitous among
modem workers, but simply that they appear to be widespread. No ideological model-
adversary or coalition-can ever apply to more than a fraction of the labor force. See
Ross, supra note 54, at 1365.
63. The NLRB has jurisdiction over nonprofit educational institutions. Cornell Uni-
versity, 183 N.L.R.B. No. 41, 74 L.R.R.M. 1269 (1970).
64. If the proper jurisdictional requirements are met the Board may order a bargain.
ing unit composed of secretaries, cf. Hamilton Watch Co., 118 N.L.R.B. 591 (1956), ste.
nographers, Eljer Co., 108 N.L.R.B. 1417 (1954), or salaried attorneys, Lumberman's Mut.
Cas. Co. of Chicago, 75 N.L.R.B. 1132 (1948).
65. The NLRB has decided to exercise jurisdiction over private and proprietary hospi-
tals which receive $250,000 in annual gross revenues. Butte Medical Properties d/bla
Medical Center Hospital, 168 N.L.R.B. 266 (1968). Private nursing homes and related
facilities are covered if they receive $100,000 in annual gross revenues. Kew Gardens
Nursing Home, 194 N.L.R.B. No. 58, 78 L.R.R.M. 1594 (1971). Nonprofit hospitals are
exempt from NLRB jurisdiction. NLRA § 2(2), 29 U.S.C. § 152(2).
This comparatively recent extension of national labor regulation to medical institutions
may bring into sharp focus the difficulty of imposing an adversary model on coalition-
oriented workers. State labor law has sometimes dealt with the problem by relaxing the
principle of employer/employee separation in such cases. For exam ple, the Connecticut
Nurses Association, which is run by supervisory nurses and is therefore "dominated," is
nonetheless allowed to represent non-supervisory nurses. No violation has been found
because the nurses desire it that way, and employee free choice is the "tap root" of the
applicable labor law. The Waterbury Hospital, Inc., Conn. Bd. L. Rel., Decision No. 89
(1968). See also Southampton Hospital, 30 S.L.R.B. 119, 123 (New York, 1967) (super-
visors allowed in same organization as supervisees).
66. Strauss, supra note 57, at 24.
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tional labor law has traditionally been locked into a model of labor
relations which discourages virtually all labor structures that differ
from the traditional adversary-oriented union.0 7 To the extent, then,
that workers identify more with management than with traditional
unions, 8 and that employers are not interested in subverting the in-
terests of their employees, 9 there is a need to relax the stringent stand-
ard of separation that has developed under § 8(a)(2). What is suggested
is not repeal of the existing law, but rather a limited redefinition of an
administratively and judicially created doctrine in order to meet the
needs of a broader group of employees. 0
III. Emergent Standards
The basis for a more flexible interpretation of § 8(a)(2) may be found
in a line of cases which has already departed from the per se rule. In
these decisions, the courts have permitted-under the banner of "co-
67. One alternative is to join the great internationals or associations ...
Another alternative is the so-called "inside union." . ..
The third alternative ... is the right not to join or create or assist any labor
organization at all ....
NLRB v. Sterling Electric Motors, 109 F.2d 194, 201-02 (9th Cir. 1940). What this court
sees as three alternatives, however, is really only two: union or no union. The inde-
pendent local really offers only the limited alternative of freedom from "the machi-
nations of 'big union' leadership." Robinson, Structural Characteristics of the Independent
Union in America, 19 LAB. L.J. 417 (1968).
Nevertheless, unaffiliated locals have seen rough handling by the Board and by national
organized labor. U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, UNAFFILIATED LOCAL & SINGLE EMPLOYER UNIONS
IN THE UNrrao STATES iii (1967). Perhaps as a consequence, unaffiliated independents
account for only 2.6% of organized labor, or a total of 452,000 members. Id. at 4. See
note 30 supra.
68. P. SULTAN, supra note 52, at 183, notes that, in the case of disaffected former union-
ists, "loyalty to the employer was not . . the automatic response to disloyalty to the
union. [The respondents] poured equal scorn on both parties .... " An even more
cogent example of employees who do not identify with their management is that of
teachers. The class struggle militancy of that professional group is an anomaly in terms
of the coalition model presented here, but perhaps can be explained by the unique
relationship of public school teachers with their municipal employers, and their long
history of substandard compensation. On the other hand, fr a long period teachers were
notorious for their willingness to accept wretched working conditions in exchange for
relatively high social perceptions. The availability of a coalition model labor organiza-
tion might allow other white-collar groups to balance these interests, rather than choos.
ing one extreme or the other.
69. It is not simply the worker who is moving away from the adversary model. Em-
ployers too "may find it more sensible to accommodate ... than to perpetuate the tra-
dition of conflict" P. SULTAN, supra note 52, at 10. Symptomatic is the increased blurring
and overlap between guarded management prerogatives and bargained-over terms and
conditions of employment. See Loomis & Herman, Management's Reserved Rights and
the NLRB-An Employer's View, 19 LAn. L.J. 695 (1968); see pp. 515-16 supra.
70. Such a change is appropriately one for the courts to make, rather than the Con-
gress. In the first place, the traditional doctrines of domination and support are them-
selves court-made and Board-made. Further, an across.the-board legislative change may
not be as discriminating as a case-by-case approach in making interstitial changes-cspe-
cially where, as here, a reinterpretation to cover unusual cases is suggested.
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operation"-labor organizations and employer action which were
clearly and admittedly violations under the traditional view of domi-
nation and support. Two touchstones emerge from these somewhat
confusing cases: actual employer intent to dominate by coercion or
manipulation, and actual employee dissatisfaction with the organiza-
tion in question.
A. Motive: Employer Intent to Coerce
In the earliest of the "cooperation" cases, Chicago Rawhide Manu.
facturing Co. v. NLRB, 71 the employees independently made the de-
cision to form a shop committee, and management assisted them by
drawing up ballots and forms, and by helping with the election of
officers.72 Under existing precedent73 the management's action was a
clear violation of 8(a)(2). The Board so found and issued a cease and
desist order.
74
The Sixth Circuit, in reversing the order, suggested several reasons
why the facts in Chicago Rawhide did not constitute a case of support,
but rather were an example of cooperation. One of these reasons, it
appears, was that the employer did not exhibit improper intent.15 The
record, said the court, "shows that the Company was not intending...
to coerce or influence the employees' choice of bargaining represen-
tative." 710 Introducing the element of intent was a departure from prior
8(a)(2) cases. 77 To the extent it was ever discussed in applying the tra-
ditional per se rule, intent was deemed to be implicit in the very ac-
71. 221 F.2d 165 (6th Cir. 1955).
72. 105 N.L.R.B. 727, 730-31 (1953).
73. The Board report, 105 N.L.R.B. 727, 735 (1953), cites as authority Axelson Mfg. Co.,
88 N.L.R.B. 761 (1950); American Thread Co., 84 N.L.R.B. 593 (1949); The Carpenter
Steel Co., 76 N.L.R.B. 670 (1948).
74. 105 N.L.R.B. 727 (1953).
75. The particular standards applied by the Sixth Circuit in Chicago Rawhide are
far from clear. Although the court appears to depart considerably from the per se rule,
there is still language in the decision in keeping with the traditional cases.
As noted in the text, the court seems to be emphasizing the element of intent. Yet there
is also language in the opinion that suggests the contrary. Thus the court at one point
states that support, "even though innocent," is prohibited. 221 F.2d at 167. See note 105
infra.
76. 221 F.2d at 170.
77. See note 10 supra. The intent element is less novel in other unfair labor practice
areas, although in such cases the standard is specific intent rather than tile broader
concept suggested here and developed further at pp. 522, 528-29 infra. For discussion
of an intent standard in the context of § 8(a)(3), see Christensen & Svanoe, Motive and
Intent in the Commission of Unfair Labor Practices: The Supreme Court and the Fictive
Formality, 77 YALE L.J. 1269 (1968); Getman, Section S(aX3) of the NLRA and the Effort
to Insulate Free Employee Choice, 32 U. Cm. L. REV. 735 (1965); Note, Proving an
8(aX3) Violation: the Changing Standard, 114 U. oF PA. L. REv. 866 (1966); Oberer, supra
note 3.
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tions of the employer,78 and was certainly not a necessary element of
the offense3 9
The second important "cooperation" case is Coppus Engineering v.
NLRB.80 After an election which the Steelworkers lost, the manager
of the plant suggested to the employees "that they have a permanent
grievance committee, if that is what they wanted to call it, to handle
grievances."81 The committee functioned satisfactorily for a year, using
company property and company time, until the Steelworkers filed an
8(a)(2) charge. The First Circuit reversed, citing Chicago Rawhide.
The court noted that "[the] evidence shows no more than cooperation
by petitioner and a possibility of company control,"8 2 and that "there
is no actual evidence of domination of the Committee by petitioner."8 3
The employer's intent appeared particularly relevant to Judge Magru-
der, who noted in his concurrence that "the record contains no history
of anti-union bias by this company,"84 and that
[i]f the employees should freely choose a different bargaining rep-
resentative, there is no basis in the record for an inference that
the company would drag its feet in resistance to recognition of
such a new bargaining representative, as the law requires."8
Finally, in Modern Plastics v. NLRB,8 6 the employer provided the
employees' committee with all types of secretarial services, and a plant
conference room for meetings; paid the committee members during
78. Generally, intent is scrutinized in traditional 8(a)(2) cases only when the overt
actions are in themselves not conclusive. Thus, although the employer's actual behavior
in relation to the challenged organization might be ambiguous, it is a violation nonethe-
less when "the respondent's desire to frustrate organization by the emplo)ees in a union
of their own choosing is manifest from the circumstances preceding and surrounding its
creation.' The Nubone Company, Inc., 62 N.L.R.B. 321, 321 (1945). In short, hostile in-
tent is scrutinized to condemn the employer when he is otherwise not in violation of
even the per se standard of domination and support, but benign intent is not available
as exculpatory evidence under any circumstances. See note 10 supra But cf. Note, Sec-
tion (aX2), supra note 4, at 361 n.69, which suggests that intent may have played an
unexpressed role in all § 8(a)(2) cases.
There is some suggestion, however, that if the employer has a benign intent, the
Board's order must be limited to disestablishment only, rather than a generalized order
to obey the Act. NLRB v. Empress Publishing Co., 312 U.S. 426, 435-36 (1941); NLRB
v. jas. H. Matthews & Co., 156 F.2d 706, 710 (1946); Northeastern Engineering Inc., 112
N.9..B. 743 (1955).
79. "No proof of coercive intent or result is necessary to establish an [8(a)(2)] unfair
labor practice on the part of the employer." Int'l Union, Progressive Mine Workers of
America v. NLRB, 319 F.2d 428, 436 (7th Cir. 1963), revd mere. on other grounds, 375
U.S. 396 (1963).
80. 240 F.2d 564 (Ist Cir. 1956).
81. Id. at 567.
82. Id. at 573 (emphasis added).
83. Id. at 572.
84. Id. at 573.
85. Id. at 573-74.
86. 379 F.2d 201 (6th Cir. 1967).
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meetings; paid for dinner and drinks; was present at committee meet-
ings; suggested operating procedures; and gave advice on elections,81
The Board found these actions to be domination, and ordered the com-
mittee disestablished. The Sixth Circuit, however, after again stressing
its perceived difference between cooperation and domination, reversed,
saying:
It is true that the acts rendered might be the means by which the
Company could exert pressure, but we do not find any substantial
evidence in the record that it was so used by the Company....
[T]he record contains no showing of anti-union bias by the
Company.88
Thus, absent a showing of employer bad faith, assistance alone is not
per se violative.
Although the cooperation cases are not entirely clear or consistent,
the standard they suggest for a § 8(a)(2) violation is employer assistance
tainted by an intent to coerce. Such a standard properly focuses on the
employer's bad faith, his willingness to use manipulation and coercion
as means of adjusting industrial differences," his designed90 and will-
ful9' denial of the rights of employees under the Act.
As the cooperation cases demonstrate, there are numerous instances
in which an employer might wish to maintain or assist a labor organi-
zation without having any intent to coerce. Aside from the obvious
examples of well-meant personal gifts, Christmas parties, free meals,
and occasional use of company equipment, an employer might wish to
maintain an employees' committee as a "channel of communication,"92
or as a more equitable and efficient way of settling grievances. If, for
example, a university should set up a grievance committee for its labo-
ratory technicians after they have rejected an outside union, and if the
university's motives are its desire to have some sort of functioning in-
formation conduit despite insufficient initiative among the employ-
ees,93 there would seem to be no national labor policy objective served
87. Id. at 202, 203.
88. Id. at 204.
89. Cf. Blackman, Relative Severity of Employer Unfair Labor Practices, 22 LAB. L.J.
67, 68 (1971).
90. Cf. NLRB v. Buitoni Foods Corp., 298 F.2d 169, 174 (3rd Cir. 1962).
91. Cf. Federal-Mogul Corp. v. NLRB, 394 F.2d 915, 920 (6th Cir. 1968).
92. Social science and industrial management literature always stresses the importance
of "keeping open lines of communication." See, e.g., L. ADAMS, MANAGERIAL PSYCHOLOGY
357 (1965). It is odd that this literature can virtually ignore the legal problems which
such communication can present. See, e.g., H. ALBERS, PRINCIPLES OF ORGANIZATION AND
MANAGEMENT 212-13 (1965).
93. The worker in any case will often be a client. See Ross, supra note 60, at 1366.
The organization may be a union run by a professional union hierarchy, or, like fore-
men's clubs and secretaries' guilds, may be run by the employer.
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by disestablishing the council, at least if the technicians are satisfied
with it.9 On the other hand, if General Motors should organize and
maintain an employees' association with the plan of ousting the United
Auto Workers, then clearly GM has rejected the basic premises of the
NLRA. Because employer assistance is indisputable in each case, both
plans would be struck down under the traditional per se rule.9 i The
application of the intent to coerce standard, however, would eliminate
the abusive organization while sparing the non-detrimental one.00
B. Free Choice: Employee Dissatisfaction
The other element suggested in the cooperation line of cases is em-
ployee choice and satisfaction. Previously, although many 8(a)(2) cases
had been decided in the name of preserving the Act's guaranteed free-
dom of choice0 7 the opinions of the employees actually involved in the
case had been considered irrelevant. 8 Chicago Rawhide, however, in
refusing to disestablish an organization which satisfied the employees
concerned, gave content to employee satisfaction as a measure for domi-
nation and support. "The test of whether an employee organization is
employer controlled is not an objective one, but rather subjective, from
the standpoint of the employees." 99 While similar language had been
used in the past, the courts had never been clear as to what it en-
tailed.100 To the Chicago Rawhide court, however, this test seems to
94. The standard of employee satisfaction is discussed at pp. 523-25 infra.
95. There are no 8(a)(2) cases dealing with universities, presumably bemuse the Board
has only recently extended jurisdiction to them. See note 63 supra. Howemer. it seems
clear that the Board, given its hostility to employees' committees, would not allow either
of the hypothetical organizations to stand. See pp. 513-14 supra.
96. Factors to be considered in applying the intent to coerce standard are considered
further at pp. 528-29 infra.
Not all would agree that a standard based on the employer's intent is workable. See
Note, 11 U. KANS. L. R~v. 281, 283 (1962) (commenting on the cooperation cases).
97. See, e.g., NLRB v. The Summers Fertilizer Co., 251 F.2d 514 (1st Cir. 1958); NLRB
v. Wemyss, 212 F.2d 465 (9th Cir. 1954). In these cases, the supposed infringement of
freedom of choice is based more on judicial conjecture than on actual evidence.
98. Thus, in NLRB v. Newport News Shipbldg. & Drydock Co., 308 U.S. 241, 248
(1939), which was decided in the name of employee free choice, the Court ordered dis-
establishment although a "sweeping majority" of the employees desired to have the
challenged organization continue. See also cases cited in note 11 supra.
99. 221 F.2d at 168.
100. This standard had been mentioned before, but seemingly gratuitously; it appar-
ently had never been applied to sustain a challenged organization. See, e.g., Tappan
Stove Co. v. NLRB, 174 F.2d 1007 (1949), which gave expression to this principle of sub-
jective domination yet disestablished an inside committee claiming the allegiance of 437
of 516 employees in the presence of a "long history of friendly labor relationship be-
tween the respondent and its employees." Id. at 1009. See also Sharples Chemical Co. v.
NLRB, 209 F.2d 645 (6th Cir. 1954); NLRB v. Thompson Products, 130 F.2d 363, 368 (6th
Cir. 1942); Feldman & Steinberg, Ermployee-Management Comnittees and the Labor Man-
agement Relations Act of 1947, 35 TUL. L. Rav. 365, 372 (1961). Other commentators hale
agreed that the honest application of this standard is incompatible with a per -c ap-
proach. See THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAw 138 (C.J. Morris ed. 1971).
Most cases seem to have followed the Supreme Court's early disinterest in subjective
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mean that any amount of assistance is permissible provided the em-
ployees do not feel hampered. Employer control, the court suggests,
exists only when the labor organization begins to deviate from the will
of the employees. 101
Similarly, in Coppus Engineering, Judge Magruder said:
No doubt, strong argument could be made that the [shop com-
mittee which the Board had found dominated] was an inherently
weak bargaining representative, and a feeble instrument for con-
ducting bitter economic warfare, as contrasted with a union affili-
ated with a strong national labor organization. But it may be that
the employees at this particular plant did not feel the need of any
different type of bargaining representative. The choice was theirs,
and the Act guarantees to them freedom to exercise that choice,
unimpeded by employer interference or coercion.
10 2
This standard of employee satisfaction was also made explicit in
Modern Plastics. Noting that the challenged organization had been
operating for ten years to the satisfaction of all but the complaining
Machinists' Union, the court quoted with approval, and apparently
adopted as its ratio decidendi, a remark by the Trial Examiner:
I am persuaded by the credible evidence of witnesses called by
both parties to this proceeding that despite the unlawful character
of the Committee and despite Respondent's unlawful intrusions
into its affairs, nevertheless the employees whom the Committee
represents have derived considerable benefit from its representa-
tions and none have been shown to have been dissatisfied either
with the Committee itself or with the particular type of represen-
tation it provided them. 0
3
In short, the Sixth Circuit found that the actions of management did
not constitute domination because the court did "not find any sub-
stantial evidence in the record that it . . . was so considered by the
employees."'
104
employee satisfaction, see p. 513 supra, and to have felt that "[n] o proof of coercive...
result is necessary to establish an unfair labor practice on the part of the employer."
Int'l Union, Progressive Mine Workers of America v. NLRB, 319 F.2d 428, 436 (7th Cir.
1963), rev'd mem. on other grounds, 375 U.S. 396 (1963). In the face of langua € such as
this, the distinction drawn by the cooperation cases between "actual' and 'potential"
domination is a substantial departure. See, e.g., Chicago Rawhide Mfg. Co. v. NLRB,
221 F.2d 165, 170 (7th Cir. 1955).
101. See also NLRB v. Keller Ladders Southern, Inc., 405 F.2d 663 (5th Cir. 1968).
"So long as the acts of cooperation do not interfere with the freedom of choice of the em-
ployees, there is no violation of the Act." Id. at 667 (emphasis added).
102. 240 F.2d at 573 (concurring opinion) (emphasis added).
103. 379 F.2d at 203 (emphasis modified).
104. Id. at 204.
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This approach seems well within the spirit of the NLRA. Since em-
ployee freedom of choice is an underlying goal of the Act, the satisfac-
tion or dissatisfaction of employees should be a controlling factor. Yet
under the traditional per se rule, the law, instead of guaranteeing free-
dom to choose, imposed a solution.
It should not, however, be assumed that tie standards suggested by
the cooperation cases have been universally recognized.10 5 The more
traditional per se approach continues to guide the Board 00 and, fre-
quently, the courts.107 Nevertheless, these cases have found some accept-
ance, and the elements discussed above have been weighed in uphold-
ingl s or disapproving 109 challenged organizations.
C. Adoption of the Emergent Standards
The greatest barrier to adopting the new standards delineated here
arguably lies in inferences which may be drawn from actions by Con-
gress and the Supreme Court. During the debate preceding the Taft-
Hartley amendments, Congress did consider an alteration of tie tradi-
tional domination and support rule. The House bill contained a pro-
105. The standards discussed here are not immediately apparent front any one of the
cooperation opinions; moreover, the cases themselves still display the class-stru&gle
rhetoric of more traditional cases. For example, by denominating as "cooperation" the
actions of management in what are really joint ventures between emplo)er and em-
ployee, the courts perpetuate the myth that the employees' committees are wholly inde-
pendent labor organizations.
An explanation for the ambiguity of the cooperation opinions might be that they
were not conscious of breaking new ground. For example, in scrutinizing the employer's
intent, or in giving more than mere lip service to employee free choice, the cooperation
opinions may have understood themselves simply to be searching for the determinative
factor in a close case. See note 78 supra.
106. See, e.g., St. Joseph Lead Co., 171 N.L.R.B. 545 (1968); Newman-Green, Inc., 161
N.L.R.B. 1062 (1966); Framco, Inc., 158 N.L.R.B. 111 (1966).
107. See, e.g., NLRB v. Clappers Mfg., Inc., 458 F.2d 41.1 (3rd Cir. 1972); NLRB v.
Ampex Corp., 442 F.2d 82 (7th Cir. 1971). cert. denied, 404 U.S. 939 (1971); Schwarzen-
bach-Huber Co. v. NLRB, 408 F.2d 236, 256-57 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 960
(1969). In NLRB v. Reed Rolled Thread Die Co., 432 F.2d 70 (1st Cir. 1970), the court
ordered disestablishment of an employees' committee; stating that the case went "be)ond"
its earlier decision in Coppus Engineering, the court held that
the contentions of respondents that the employees have apparently been satisfied
with the arrangement, having twice voted down an outside union, that there has
been an absence of labor strife and anti-union bias do not command an opposite
result.
Id. at 71.
108. Lake City Foundry Co. v. NLRB, 432 F.2d 1162 (7th Cir. 1970); Federal-Mogul
Corp. v. NLRB, 394 F.2d 915 (6th Cir. 1968); NLRB v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 333 F.2d
181 (7th Cir. 1962); Hotpoint Co. v. NLRB, 289 F.2d 683 (7th Cir. 1961); Kimbrell v.
NLRB, 290 F.2d 799, 802 (4th Cir. 1961).
109. NLRB v. Keller Ladders Southern, Inc., 405 F.2d 663 (5th Cir. 1968); NLRB v.
Walton Mfg., Inc., 289 F.2d 177 (5th Cir. 1961). See also NLRB v. Buitoni Foods Corp.,
298 F.2d 169 (3rd Cir. 1962) (employer bad faith used to justify cease and desist order);
Utrad Corp. v. NLRB, 454 F.2d 520 (7th Cir. 1971) (specific finding of anti-union motive
used to distinguish cooperation line and justify disestablishment).
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posed § 8(d)(3), which would have permitted assisted labor organiza-
tions by allowing the
[f]orming or maintaining by an employer of a committee of em-
ployees and discussing with it matters of mutual interest, includ-
ing grievances, wages, hours of employment, and other working
conditions, if the Board has not certified or the employer has not
recognized a representative as their representative under section
9.110
According to the House Report, this section was designed to
permit employers whose employees have not designated a bargain-
ing representative to set up .. .committees and to discuss with
them wages, hours, working conditions and other subjects of col-
lective bargaining as well as other matters of mutual interest.'11
The Senate version did not include this provision, however, and it was
eliminated in conference. 112 Subsequently, in NLRB v. Cabot Carbon
Co., 1" 3 the Supreme Court clearly rejected the suggestion that the in-
tent of this deleted provision was effectively encompassed by other
Taft-Hartley amendments:" 4 "This argument treats the [situation] as
though Congress had adopted, rather than rejected as it did, the pro.
posed § 8(d)(3) advocated by the House." 115
110. H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. § 8(d)(3) (1947), reprinted in 1 NLRB, LvastaATivE
HISTORY OF THE LABOR-1MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACr, 1947, at 31, 56 (1918).
111. HOUSE REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 33, reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATrvE
HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACr, 1947, at 292, 324 (1948).
112. The Conference Report stated:
This provision is omitted from the conference agreement since the Act by its terms
permits individual employees and groups of employees to meet with the employer
and section 9(a) of the conference agreement permits employers to answer their
grievances.
H.R. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 45 (1947).
113. 360 U.S. 203 (1959).
114. It was Cabot's contention that the proper reading of the Taft-Hartley amend-
ment to § 9(a) must logically exclude employees' committees from the class of labor
organizations, and therefore prohibitions against domination and support of labor organi-
zations do not apply. 360 U.S. at 214-15. The § 9(a) amendment added to the proviso
in the original Act which read:
Provided, That any individual employee or a group of employees shall have the right
at any time to present grievances to their employer.
the addition:
and to have such grievances adjusted, without the intervention of the bargaining
representative, as long as the adjustment is not inconsistent with the terms of a
collective bargaining contract or agreement then in effect, Provided further, That
the bargaining representative has been given opportunity to be present at such
adjustment.
29 U.S.C. § 159(a).
115. 360 U.S. at 217. Unmoved by Cabot's arguments of constructive legislative intent,
the Court held that the definition of "labor organization" covers employees' committees,
since Congress inserted the term "dealing with" into the NLRA's definition of "labor
organization" to extend it to more than traditional unions. See note 4 supra.
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Despite this apparent aversion of both the Court and Congress to
assisted labor organizations, there are a number of distinguishing fac-
tors which render these past judgments inapplicable to the present
problem. First, Cabot Carbon was not technically addressed to the
broader issue of whether some assisted labor organizations could be
acceptable under certain conditions. Instead, the argument was di-
rected, and the opinion was confined, to the narrower issue of whether
assisted employees' committees are properly called labor organizations
under the Act. On this point, the opinion was clearly correct in decid-
ing that they were so included, and there is thus no need to overrule
the holding of Cabot Carbon in order to apply the standards suggested
here. Indeed, the suggested standards are premised on the assumption
that employees' committees and other assisted employee groups are
labor organizations, in that the revised standards, being an interpre-
tation of 8(a)(2), would apply only to labor organizations. Second, to
the extent that the rejection of § 8(d)(3) may be interpreted as a policy
determination by Congress, it is far from clear that it was an endorse-
ment of the per se rule of 8(a)(2). The traditional doctrine of domina-
tion and support was judicially and administratively-not legislatively
-developed, and the failure of Congress to provide contrary legislation
does not necessarily preclude the courts from reevaluating a doctrine
they have created.' 16
IV. Application of the New Standards
The utility of permissibly-assisted labor organizations to employees
and to national labor policy will depend, in practice, on the diligence
of the Board and the courts in applying the proposed standards of
employer intent and employee dissatisfaction.117 Once a complainant
succeeded in demonstrating either that the employer's intent is to sub-
vert, shackle, or dilute the employees' rights, or that the employees are
not content with their present situation, the Board would be justified
in finding an 8(a)(2) violation. Only where there is genuine employee
satisfaction and an absence of employer hostility should management
116. Cabot Carbon has come in for heavy criticism. Petro. Labor Relations Law, 35
N.Y.U.L. REv. 732, 765 (1960), terms the NLRB view affirmed in de case a "pogrom"
against employees' committees.
117. In reality, the first application of these standards would be by the General Coun-
sel of the NLRB. In his independent prosecutorial discretion, he might refuse to issue
a complaint in an 8(a)(2) case where intent to coerce and employee dissatisfaction were
patently missing.
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be permitted to form or support a labor organization.11 Thus, the
complainant should be required to prove (1) the existence of a labor
organization, and (2) some assistance by the employer, as lie is now,
plus either (3) employer intent to coerce, or (4) employee dissatisfaction.
A. Factors Evidencing Intent to Coerce
Determining the motivation of the employer will necessarily in-
volve circumstantial evidence. A previous history of anti-organizational
activity or unfair labor practices may, for example, indicate an intent
to coerce." 9 Other objective factors from which such an intent might
be inferred include: whether the assisted labor organization was hastily
established coincidentally with an Outside union's organization
drive; 120 whether substantial progress has been made toward settle-
ment of contested issues; 12 whether the employees are required to
participate in the assisted organization or are prohibited from joining
an outside union;122 whether the company has objected to, or sabo-
taged, subsequent representation elections; 2 3 whether the assisted or-
ganization has sought exclusive representation, a closed shop, or a con-
tract barring elections; and whether the organization has in other ways
failed to contribute to the essential goals of the Act in assuring work-
ers' rights and industrial tranquillity.
Other factors which are in themselves inherently neutral as to intent,
but which have been used in the past to support 8(a)(2) violations,
would now be relevant only to the issue of assistance.' 24 These include
employer attendance at meetings; employer-provided office space,
118. Section 8(a)(2) prohibits domination of and interference with both the "administra-
tion" and "formation" of labor organizations. See note 1 supra. However, most of tile
case law dealing with § 8(a)(2) is concerned with unlawful administration rather than
formation. The reason for this appears to be the six month statute of limitations, NLRA
§ 10(b), 29 U.S.C. § 160(b), which frequently puts the actual formation of the organiza.
tion beyond the reach of the union's suit. Of course, the standards suggested here would
apply equally to both formation and administration.
119. Cf. NLRB v. Buitoni Foods Corp., 298 F.2d 169 (3rd Cir. 1962), where assistance
to a grievance committee followed weeks of anti-union threats, and coincided with plysl-
cal violence and discriminatory discharges.
120. Cf. NLRB v. Keller Ladders Southern, Inc., 405 F.2d 663 (5th Cir. 1968), where
an assisted union was presented to the employees in "an atmosphere of haste" and fore-
closed another union's organizational drive.
121. Cf. NLRB v. Chicago Rawhide Mig. Co., 221 F.2d 165, 167 (6th Cir. 1955), where
substantial disputes were resolved.
122. Cf. NLRB v. Walton Mfg. Co., 289 F.2d 177, 181 (5th Cir. 1961), where exclusive
acquiescence in a proposed employees' committee would have been a condition of emr-
ployment.
123. Cf. Lenscraft Optical Corp., 128 N.L.R.B. 807, 826 (1960), where the employer
attempted to sabotage a Board election so that an assisted organization would win.
124. Of course, the character of the assistance might in some cases be evidence of i-
tent to coerce, but the element of intent is conceptually distinct fiom the elenent of
assistance.
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equipment, or legal services; employer-drafted by-laws; meetings on
company time; and financial assistance.1
2
5
B. Factors Evidencing Employee Dissatisfaction
The clearest case of employee discontent, and by far the most con-
venient administratively, is a conclusive demonstration through an
official election where the employees reject the assisted organization. 12
Once 30% of the employees become disaffected they may, under the
terms of the Act, force such an election.12 7 An elective determination
would be almost self-executing. If the employees vote for a regular
union, it becomes by law the exclusive collective bargaining agent, 28
and the assisted organization is thus displaced. If, on the other hand,
an alternative to the employees' committee does not receive a majority,
then no conclusive determination of employee dissatisfaction has been
made out for an 8(a)(2) complaint. 12 9 Inasmuch as a permissibly-as-
sisted labor organization should not be allowed to enter into a contract




In the absence of an election, the complainant would have to em-
ploy other means to demonstrate employee discontent to the Board. 32
125. Compare cases cited in notes 12-26 supra.
With regard to the provision of financial assistance, a strict reading of § 8(a)(2) sug-
gests that the per se rule is partially written into the Act, and that consequently no in-
quiry into intent is necessary to find a violation on the basis of such assistance. That is,
the three forbidden actions are "dominate," "interfere." and "contribute" and while the
first two arguably imply an intent standard, the last does not. See the complete text at
note 1 supra. However, such a reading appears to be inconsistent with the purpose of the
section, which is to protect labor organizations. Moreover, it seems pointless to construe
this simple section in two different ways at once. Although the legislative history does
not illuminate the issue, the purpose of "contribute" is evidently to specify a particular
type of domination or interference. Thus, the most natural reading of the last clause
may be "or contribute financial or other support to it [in order to dominate or interfere
with it]," which invests the intent requirement into the whole provision. Cf. Titan Metal
Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 106 F.2d 254, 260 (3rd Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 615 (1939).
126. It appears to be within the Board's discretion to incltde upon the ballot such
non-traditional options as workers' committees and employees' representation plans, al-
though the Board has generally declined to exercise that discretion. See NLRB v. Falk,
508 U.S. 453 (1939); 32 NLRB, ANN. RaP. 90-91 (1967).
127. NLRA § 10(c), 29 U.S.C. § 160,c (1970).
128. NLRA § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970).
129. The governing standard of discontent should continue to be majoritarian, as it
has since the earliest beginnings of the labor movement. See generally Schreiber, The Ori-
gin of the Majority Rule and the Simultaneous Development of Institutions to Protect
the Minority: A Chapter in Early American Labor Law, 25 RtrrCanS L. RE%. 237 (1971).
The argument that a majority standard may result in a company union being foisted on
a desperately unhappy 499o% is unpersuasive: first, minorities are frequently dissatisfied
even with traditional unions, and second, unlike a statutory collective bargaining agent
imposed upon a minority, permissibly-assisted labor organizations would not be allowed
to act on behalf of dissenting employees. See pp. 530-31 infra.
130. See pp. 530-31 infra.
131. NLRA § 9(c)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(3).
132. Since assisted labor organizations such as employees' committees are frequently
ad hoc organizations which come into existence to fill a suddenly perceived vacuum left
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It would obviously be difficult to call in troops of employees and
question them in a structured hearing setting. In general, it would
probably be simpler for the complainant to base his 8(a)(2) action on
employer intent. Nevertheless, there are criteria that would be appro-
priate in determining whether a majority of the employees are dissatis-
fied with their assisted organization: whether a traditional union has re-
cently been rejected in a fair election; 13 3 whether the organization has
existed for some time without labor unrest; 134 whether informal polls
indicate employee dissatisfaction; 13 whether substantial issues of fair
representation have been pressed by dissident employees;' 3 0 and
whether the employees participated in establishing and maintaining
the organization. 137
C. Safeguards and Remedies
Since permissibly-assisted labor organizations are exceptions to the
longstanding rule of complete separation between labor and manage-
ment, they should not be allowed to displace or threaten traditional
unions. It is arguable that allowing some employers to form "company
unions" will surely encourage bolder abuses by truly hostile em-
ployers. While to some degree concerns such as these would be
avoided by the standards suggested here, the Board should also use its
discretionary power' 38 to ensure that such organizations, while tol-
erated, have only limited authority. That is, there should be a dif-
by the defeat of an outside union, they typically do not exist as alternatives in an initial
election. Therefore, not having a conclusive demonstration of employee discontent, and
perhaps not wishing to wait a year until a new election can be ordered, an outside
union might conceivably wish to proceed administratively with its 8(a)(2) charge.
133. Cf. Ferguson-Lander Box Co., 151 N.L.R.B. 1615 (1968), where in two successive
"clean" elections the employees voted down outside unions in order, by implication, to
stay with the employees' committee. The committee was nonetheless disestablished.
134. Cf. NLRB v. Post Publishing Co., 311 F.2d 565 (7th Cir. 1962) (38 years of har.
mony with an assisted labor organization); Hotpoint v. NLRB, 289 F.2d 683 (7th Cir.
1961) (30 years with an assisted organization); NLRB v. Summers Fertilizer, 251 F.2d 514
(1st Cir. 1958) (assisted organization lasted one month before all employees struck).
135. Cf. NLRB v. Magic Slacks, Inc., 314 F.2d 844, 847 (7th Cir. 1963), where an unim-
peached poll showed 47 to 3 in favor of the employees' committee.
136. Since permissibly-assisted labor organizations would not have the normal statu-
tory rights to represent dissenting employees, see p. 531 infra, the compulsory nature
of majoritarian collective bargaining, which serves as the basis for fair representation
cases, would not be present. However, situations are nevertheless conceivable in which
such an organization could be arbitrarily acting to harm a minority, as where its leaders
promote discriminatory policies. While this logically goes to the level of employee satis-
faction, to the extent that the employer permitted such discrimination it would also
go to his intent to coerce.
137. Cf. Erikson d/b/a Detroit Plastics Co., 114 N.L.R.B. 1014 (1955).
138. The Board has broad remedial discretion, NLRA § 10(a), 29 U.S.C. § 160(a)
(1970). In 8(a)(2) cases this has most commonly been exercised in deciding between a
cease and desist order and total disestablishment. See note 2 supra.
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ference in legal status between a traditional union and a permissibly-
assisted labor organization.
In order to avoid foreclosing the entry of a traditional union, the
employees should have considerable freedom to oust any employer-
assisted organization. This can be guaranteed by requiring that no
agreement made by an assisted organization could bar a representation
election. 139 Similarly, no assisted organization should be able to act on
behalf of anyone but its own members.
140
By discretionary use of its remedial powers, the Board could further
tailor the characteristics of assisted organizations. For example, in an
ambiguous case, even though an 8(a)(2) violation warranting disestab-
lishment is not proven, the Board might nevertheless wish to provide
that the challenged organization may not become the exclusive bar-
gaining agent, negotiate a closed shop, enforce the employer's duty to
bargain, or bring suit on any agreement. Through the Board's appli-
cation of the two standards proposed here, and through its discre-
tionary powers, traditional unions could therefore be assured their
basic right under the law: the right to be chosen by the employees
where the employees genuinely want them.' 4 ' At the same time, the
employees would remain free to join any organization they choose,
including one in which management plays a part.
V. Conclusion
Under traditional 8(a)(2) standards, employees had only two organi-
zational alternatives-either a full-fledged traditional labor organiza-
tion, divorced from the employer and committed by law to the ad-
versary model, or no organization at all. While this Note has suggested
139. The contract bar rule is administrative, so its alteration would present no prob.
lem. In such circumstances elections could be held annually if needed.
140. Such a result could be achie ed by enforcement policy. For example, since any
assisted organization which attempts to act for non-members demonstrates the employ-
er's impermissible intent to coerce as to those employees, it is therefore an 8(a)t2) 0io-
lation. See p. 528 supra. Therefore, the Board could issue an appropriate cease and
desist order. More directly, the Board might promulgate this requirement-or. indeed,
any safeguarding requirement for permissibly-assistcd labor organizations-as a regulation
to govern the conferring of employees with employers as it is empowered to do by the
proviso in § 8(a)(2). See note I supra. The Board has never exercised this power.
141. A good illustration of what the permissibly.assisted labor organization discussed
here could be like is to be found in foremen's organizations. Deemed by the law, NLRA
§ 2(3), 29 U.S.C. § 152(3), to be professionals, foremen have not been protected from
"domination" of their organizations. Ats a consequence, such organizations have t)pically
been formed, funded, and perpetuated by management, and, in keeping with the appar-
cut sympathies of their members, have offered various programs of professional improve-
inent. Despite such interference, many foremen enthusiastically participate, and their
assisted organizations have helped them in presenting their grie ances. Strauss, supra
note 57, at 17.
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a third option because of changes in the labor environment since the
early days of the Wagner Act, other alternatives exist as well. For
example, experiments in "industrial democracy" have successfully
lowered worker alienation by increasing employee decision-making
power.142 Viewed as the incursion of labor into the realm of manage-
ment prerogative, 143 industrial democracy is of particular interest be-
cause it represents the converse of employer domination. Though well
beyond the scope of this discussion,' 44 the possibility of such additional
alternatives further emphasizes the basic point developed here-that
employer-employee co-participation must be judged in light of the
particular context in which it occurs.
142. The term "industrial democracy" has a checkered background, many seeing It
as a euphemism for "company union." M. DERBER, TiE AMERICAN IDEA OF INDUSTRIAL
DEMOCRACY, 1865-1965, at 355 (1970). However, to industrial psychologists it is a neutral
term for reforms related to the fact that "there is hardly a study in the entire literature
which fails to demonstrate that satisfaction in work is enhanced or that generally acknowl-
edged beneficial consequences accrue from a genuine increase in workers' decision-making
power." P. BLUMBERG, INDUsTRIAL DEMOcRACY 123 (1968). See generally E. RIIENMAN,
INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY AND INDUSTRIAL MANAGEMENT (1968). Some success has been re-
ported in Germany's codetermination program, and France's tripartite plan. P. BLUM-
BmG, supra, at 2. Also see generally N. DAS, EXPERIMENTS IN INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY (1964);
A. SHUCHMAN, CODETERMINATION: LABOR'S MIDDLE WAY IN GERMANY (1957).
143. See Loomis & Herman, supra note 69.
144. It is noteworthy, however, that reported failures in this type of broad cooperative
industrial relationship seem to stem from precisely the two negativing standards sug-
gested here-either employer bad faith or employee dissatisfaction. Thus, where the cm-
ployees are displeased, industrial democracy is a failure. P. BLUMIIERC, supra note 142, at 3.
Similarly, in the United States during World War II, many of the labor-management
committees promoted by the War Production Board failed largely because of the tension
between workers and managers. D. DE SCHWEINITZ, LABOR AND MANAGEMENT IN A COst-
MON ENTERPRISE 156-57 (1949). Although stuck institutionally into a cooperative mold,
the participants, who were usually local union officials, reacted in terms of the adversary
model.
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